| BANGKOK, 1 February
1991
Scarlet 7 spent 15 months in Thailand before heading back to Iraq
last week. But instead of the violence he planned to leave in his
wake, he earned a reputation as leader of The Gang That Couldn't Spy
Straight.
Salim N. Al-jibouri, the high-living, debt-ridden, self-styled
leader of the Palestinian Commandos, made it far easier than it
might have been to thwart plans to bring the Gulf war to Southeast
Asia. The effective end of his story came when he voluntary left
Bangkok for home via Malaysia.
Security forces involved in uncovering his plots against peace in
Bangkok learned that Al-jibouri planned attacks against several
foreign embassies, as well as hotels and nightspots frequented by
foreigners. But he was defeated by his own magnificent mistakes.
By the time security agencies in Bangkok were ready to confront
him, the 31-year-old Iraqi diplomat:
- was deeply in debt from almost nightly rounds of drinking and
frequenting prostitutes in Bangkok's so-called Little Arabia;
- had compromised himself with an attempt to try to recruit a
Thai citizen to spy on a friendly third country;
- had completely blown his cover as “third secretary,
commercial” at the Pradipat Road embassy of Iraq by his spending
and apparent love for his distinctive, unique red Mazda RX-7
sports car, and, the greatest sin of all in his business,
- had been co-opted by the embassy of a friendly Middle East
country to tell of his work in planning violence in Thailand.
Security sources said Al-jibouri's clumsiness in basic spycraft
made cracking his so-called Palestinian Commandos easier than they
had hoped. “Basically, the man was shoddy,” said one source.
How bad a spy was he?
The night before he left Thailand, Mr Al-jibouri started a
bonfire in the backyard of his Paholyothin Road apartment house,
apparently to burn incriminating papers. The next morning, security
agents picked up a boxload of unburned papers from the cold fire.
The papers, including marked Bangkok maps and lists of
establishments popular with foreigners, confirmed for investigators
what they already knew: a security alert issued January 19 helped
prevent possible violence in Bangkok.
“Al-jibouri was planning terror attacks or a campaign in Bangkok
in order to focus some of the heat of the (Gulf) war publicity
elsewhere,” said one source familiar with the case.
The Iraqi agent was questioned by authorities after they
uncovered the ring, and he provided enough information to allow
police to pick up five other suspects. In addition, he confirmed
that a second Iraqi embassy diplomat, Muzir Darie Razoki, was his
partner.
Razoki, who also left Thailand “voluntarily” with Al-jibouri, was
identified as one of several Iraqi intelligence agents expelled from
the United States last August in the wake of the invasion of Kuwait.
He was immediately reassigned to Bangkok, apparently as Al-jibouri's
immediate boss.
It was from Razoki's home, in the same Soi Aree 5 apartment
complex as Al-jibouri, that alleged members of the “Palestinian
Commandos” received guns, grenades and TNT. The delivery sparked the
actual anti- terrorism alert in Thailand, and was the specific
“credible source” cited by the US State Department in a warning to
American citizens.
Although the two diplomats and five other Arabs have been
identified — and all but one have left Thailand — the whereabouts of
the weapons remains unknown. For this reason, some security
officials have been reluctant to call off the general anti-terrorist
alert in Bangkok.
The Gang That Couldn't Spy Straight was broken, however, because
Al- jibouri was such a poor intelligence agent. He made so many
mistakes that a casual reader of spy novels would be hard-pressed to
believe his story.
In a trade where anonymity is a virtue, Al-jibouri was the man
you couldn't forget.
He travelled everywhere in his distinctive scarlet car — the
source, perhaps, for his Mukhabarat codename.
He not only did his boozing and womanising in the Little Arabia
area of Soi Nana, but he insisted on meeting his secret contacts in
the same place, time after time.
While his pregnant wife and a son who was chronically ill because
of Bangkok pollution sat at home, Al-jibouri was the high-profile
man who liked to take two prostitutes with him each time.
When his own money ran out, he began to use operational funds
from the intelligence agency to support his high living. When that
wasn't enough, he signed the tab.
Al-jibouri had lingering debts in several bars and restaurants
along his night life routes.
Security sources have refused to provide details, but available
information leads to the conclusion it was his debts which made it
possible for another country to exploit him. The sources also have
refused to identify the country whose Bangkok-based officials got
information from Al-jibouri, except to say it was “a country
friendly to Thailand.”
But one source said Al-jibouri's fatal mistake was to try to
recruit a member of this unidentified embassy in his own scheme.
“He didn't just fail here,” said the source. “He crashed and
burned. They (the third country) turned him to work for them
instead.”
His boss in Iraq will be unlikely to rate Mr Al-jibouri's Bangkok
assignment as a good career move.
In addition to the debts, bad reputation and security breaches he
left behind for other Iraqis to try to clear up, there also is the
question of at least five Arabs he put in jail by revealing their
details to others.
“He is a clumsy man,” said one source.
“He'll have to explain all this when he gets to Baghdad. I'd like
to hear how he reports how it wasn't really his fault. He'll have to
blame it on someone else for sure.”
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